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I. INTRODUCTION
When Lori Driver, an anti-abortion activist, learned that Lisa Smith'
was scheduled to have an abortion the following day, Driver looked up
Smith's telephone number and left her two telephone messages. Smith did
not return Driver's calls, so Driver stepped up her efforts, going to Smith's
house and leaving anti-abortion literature and a plastic model of a fetus on
her doorstep. The next morning, the day of Smith's scheduled abortion,
Driver left a message on her answering machine, asking her parents to call
about a medical emergency involving their daughter. When Smith arrived at
the clinic for her appointment, a protestor called out to her by name and
accused her of murdering her baby. An unknown caller left a message for
Smith at the clinic that Smith's parents knew about her plan and were
distraught. Meanwhile, a clinic representative called Driver's number
pretending to be Smith's father returning her message, and the person at the
other end informed him that Smith had gone in for an abortion.2
1. For the purposes of this Note, "Lisa Smith" is used to denote the anonymous patient.
2. Robbinsdale Clinic v. Pro-Life Action Ministries, 515 N.W.2d 88, 90, 94-95 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994) (Lansing, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that significant details-such as the
message left for Smith by someone masquerading as her parents and the public yelling of her full
name-were left out of the majority opinion's description of the facts but were included in the
dissent's.
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This example has become all too ordinary. (Incidentally, a divided
court denied relief to Smith.) Having lost the legal battle to criminalize
abortion, 3 anti-abortion protestors have shifted to a strategy of extralegal
deterrence through various techniques of shaming, harassment, and
obstruction. Protestors publicize the names of patients 4 and, in at least one
case, their medical records.5 They film patients entering and leaving clinics,
and post the images on the Internet.6 They record license plates in clinic
parking lots; track down drivers' names and addresses; visit patients'
homes; and send letters to them and their families, friends, boyfriends, and
husbands.7 Protestors even pose as abortion providers, taking down
personal information from callers and using that information to contact
family members and urge them to intervene. 8
Abortion doctors are also targets of intentional exposure. Protestors
picket outside doctors' homes, photograph them, videotape them, and
observe them through binoculars. 9 They leaflet cars with the names and
addresses of clinic staff.10 They post doctors' names, addresses, phone
numbers, and license plate numbers, as well as video footage of clinic
entrances, on the Internet." Intent on going further, they have been
planning, and may already have begun, to broadcast clinic footage on
public access television.1
2
3. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 163 (1973) (holding that "the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty ... encompass[es] a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy" and consequently that states cannot intervene to protect the interests
of the fetus before it becomes viable).
4. See Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (describing how defendants
obtained information about two women scheduled to undergo abortions and, on the day of their
appointment, stood at the entrance to the clinic parking lot holding up signs displaying these
women's names).
5. Stephanie Simon, Privacy at Stake in New Antiabortion Strategy Debate: A Woman
Injured During a Procedure in Illinois Finds Her Medical Data Posted on a Web Site, L.A.
TrMES, July 6, 2001, at A18 (describing how one woman, who suffered complications resulting
from an abortion, discovered that her photograph and medical records had been posted on the
Internet).
6. Yochi J. Dreazen, In the Shadows: Photos of Women Who Get Abortions Go Up on
Internet, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2002, at Al.
7. Steve McVicker, Poison Pen: Bryan Anti-Abortionists Use the Mail-and the Law-To
Escalate Their Attacks on Clinic Workers, HOUSTON PRESS, Mar. 23, 2000, at
http://www.houstonpress.com/issues/2000-03-23/news.htmll/index.html.
8. See Bonacci v. Save Our Unborn Lives, Inc., 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 259 (C.P. Phila. County
1979).
9. See Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 521 (Tex. 1993).
10. Bella English, Career of Choice: Dianne Luby Braves Threats and Political Storms as
CEO of Planned Parenthood in Massachusetts, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 2001, at El.
11. See The Nuremberg Files, at http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/index.htm (last
visited Nov. 14, 2002).
12. See Robyn Blumner, Abortioncam May Be Disheartening but It's Legally Sound, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at ID (reporting that Neal Horsley, creator of The Nuremberg
Files website, had sent out an e-mail request for supporters to air abortion-clinic footage on local
public access stations).
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What all these activities-to which this Note refers as "abortion
outing"--have in common is that they destroy the privacy and anonymity'
3
on which the practice of abortion fundamentally depends. Patients need
anonymity to be safe from community retaliation and free from the
unwanted influence of friends, family members, and acquaintances. Doctors
need privacy to be safe from harassment or violence by community
members who oppose what they do. Abortion opponents have rightly
guessed that reducing anonymity deters abortion, and their guess is paying
off. Fewer and fewer doctors are practicing abortion, to the point where
abortion is no longer accessible in much of the country, 14 and prospective
patients have been driven away from clinics by the threat of publicity.'
5
Because Roe's constitutional right to privacy only protects women
against state actors, abortion-rights advocates have fought at the federal and
state levels for statutory and judicial protections against protestors. At the
federal level, for example, they have helped pass the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act of 1995 (FACE),' 6 which criminalizes the use of,
among other things, force or threats to prevent women from entering
clinics, and the Drivers' Privacy Protection Act of 1994,17 which makes it
more difficult for anti-abortion activists, among others, to obtain personal
information based on names and license plates. At the state and local levels,
they have secured laws, 18 ordinances,' 9 and injunctions 20 restricting protests
outside clinic entrances and doctors' homes.
13. This Note generally uses privacy and anonymity interchangeably, even though technically
it uses "anonymity" to denote a particular type of the more general concept of "privacy," because
anonymity is so central to the abortion issue. Specifically, anonymity describes the condition of
being free from individualized identification or recognition. Although it is distinct from other
forms of privacy such as reserve, mental repose, autonomy, or seclusion, it is closely connected to
these forms for reasons that, if not clear at the outset, should become clear in the course of this
Note.
14. As of 1996, eighty-six percent of all U.S. counties had no identified abortion provider,
aid thirty-two percent of women of reproductive age lived in these counties. Press Release, The
Alan Guttmacher Institute, Abortion Providers Decreased 14% Between 1992 and 1996 (1998), at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/archives/newsrelease3OO6.html.
15. See The O'Reilly Factor: Unresolved Problem (FOX News television broadcast, Aug. 3,
2001) (interview with anti-abortion activist Neal Horsley).
16. Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2002)).
17. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725).
Although a general privacy protection measure, this Act was specifically advanced as a means of
protecting the privacy of abortion clinic staff and patients. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. 7105 (1992)
(statement of Rep. Moran).
18. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3427 (West 1996) (duplicating FACE's protections and
providing that, in litigation arising under this provision, courts shall "take all steps reasonably
necessary to safeguard the individual privacy and prevent harassment of a health care patient,
licensed health practitioner, or employee, client, or customer of a health care facility who is a
party or witness in the proceeding, including granting protective orders"); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-9-122(3) (1998) (making it unlawful to engage in certain acts of advocacy within 100 feet of
a health care facility's entrance without the consent of the targeted audience).
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So far, however, advocates have largely overlooked common-law
privacy rights as a possible source of protection. This may be a serious
mistake. Two common-law torts, in particular, are well suited to the
specific harm of abortion outing: the intrusion tort, which covers wrongful
intrusions into a person's physical seclusion or personal affairs, and the
publication tort, which covers wrongful publication of private facts. These
torts are expressively valuable in that they focus on the individuals being
harmed rather than on their general class, and empower these individuals to
seek change directly through the courts rather than waiting to be protected
by their legislators. The torts are also practical in that they actually
compensate victims of past violations. They are easier to pursue than
legislation, which requires tremendous momentum to overcome the burden
of inertia, opposition from interest groups, and competition from other
legislative priorities. They carry a lower burden of proof than criminal
statutes such as FACE and may apply to a wider range of conduct.
21
Moreover, given the Supreme Court's division over questions related to
abortion privacy and its growing resistance to federal law that does not fall
neatly within Congress's Commerce Clause powers,22 the states may now
be the more promising arena for protecting abortion-related privacy.
This Note examines the possibility of using common-law privacy rights
to cover gaps left by other forms of legal protection. Part II sorts out the
various privacy interests at stake in the debate over abortion outing and
takes stock of the conflicting interests of anti-abortion protestors, which
courts must also weigh. Part III develops an account of which privacy
interests might be protected through the common law. It will be clear from
this account that, in its current form, the common law fails to match many
19. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476-77, 498 (1988) (describing how the town board
of Brookfield, Wisconsin, passed an antipicketing ordinance in response to disruptive protests
outside a local doctor's house).
20. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991); N.Y.
State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989); Miss. Women's Med. Clinic
v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1989); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates
for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic
Church, 765 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1991); NOW v. Operation Rescue, 747 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C.
1990).
21. FACE applies only to force, threats of force, or physical obstruction. 18 U.S.C.
§ 248(a)(1)-(2).
22. Compare, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding the constitutionality of a
state law protecting the right of abortion seekers to limit their contact with anti-abortion
protestors), with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding state provisions
requiring doctors to inform abortion seekers of available materials that describe the effects of an
abortion on the fetus). See also infra notes 146-152 and accompanying text (discussing the Hill
decision). For an example of the Court's recent turn toward a narrower reading of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding
that Congress did not have authority under the Commerce Clause to enact 42 U.S.C. § 13,981
(1994), part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which provided a federal civil remedy
for victims of gender-motivated violence).
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of our intuitions about privacy, or, at best, is inconsistent. Part IV addresses
constitutional limits and considerations. Part V concludes.
II. THEORIZING THE HARM
This Part lays out the normative background to the legal controversy
over abortion outing by considering how abortion outing is harmful, why
abortion providers and patients value their privacy in the first place, and
finally, what interests are served by abortion outing.
A. The Value of Privacy to Abortion Seekers and Providers
The outing tactics described earlier are harmful in several legally
distinct ways. To begin with, abortion staff and patients experience being
filmed or otherwise exposed as an invasion of their personal space, as a
form of harassment, as embarrassing or dangerous public exposure, or even
as a veiled threat.23 In one sense, this experience may affect patients more
deeply because they are in the midst of what may be, for them, an
emotionally or ethically difficult decision; in another sense, it falls harder
on abortion providers, who must face a more sustained campaign of
exposure and harassment. Once anti-abortion protestors have collected
personal information, they disseminate it in ways that are independently
harmful to the individuals exposed-by displaying signs or by broadcasting
information on cable television or the Internet. Put differently, the behavior
at issue involves two moments of communication that implicate different
privacy interests: In one, a message is being sent to the clinic patient or
employee; in the other, a message is being sent to the outside world and to
other anti-abortion protestors (and, indirectly, to the unwilling subject as
well).
Moreover, depending on their relationship to the abortion procedure,
different individuals have different reasons for valuing their informational
privacy. An abortion patient may fear that her decision will be revealed to
people she knows-her parents, her partner, or others. The consequences of
such a revelation might be severe; one eighteen-year-old, for example, was
thrown out of her parents' home and forced to drop out of college after an
anti-abortion protestor informed her parents that she had visited the clinic.2 4
The interest in keeping such information from one's intimates is validated,
if only symbolically, by the Court's abortion jurisprudence, which
23. See infra text accompanying notes 24, 64-65.
24. Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at app. E, Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766 (1986) (No. 84-495) [hereinafter
ACLU Brief].
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recognizes that, in many cases, women will only be able to choose abortion
if they can conceal that choice from others.2 5 Patients may also have
complicated feelings about their decision and, for that reason, may dread
the emotional effects of a personal confrontation with anti-abortion
strangers. Abortion providers have somewhat different fears; they fear that
information about their activities will reach hostile strangers-militants
who will harass them and their families and who might well cause them
26Thsitrsinjury. This interest is, of course, causally connected with the issue of
women's choice: Without abortion providers, the right to choose abortion
becomes imaginary. At least one court has taken note of this reality, holding
that state laws that facilitate harassment of abortion providers-by
providing the public with information about where clinics are located, with
which organizations they are associated, and how many abortions they
perform annually-violate their patients' decisional privacy rights.27
B. The Interests Potentially Served by Abortion Outings
Of course, before a court can take any steps against abortion outing, it
must consider the interests at stake on the other side.28 Activist Neal
Horsley has identified two main benefits of outing: deterrence and
publicity. Taking video footage of clinic entrances, among other acts,
embarrasses and possibly deters prospective patients and allows the world
to see what an abortion clinic looks like and what kinds of people are
25. See Thomburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766 (1986)
("A woman and her physician will necessarily be more reluctant to choose an abortion if there
exists a possibility that her decision and her identity will become known publicly."), overruled on
other grounds by Casey, 505 U.S. 833; see also infra text accompanying notes 120-124.
26. See Planned Parenthood v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 638-39 (Ct. App. 2000)
(considering whether to grant a discovery order for the release of clinic staffs personal
information, and anticipating the likely harm arising from such an order); see also Dudley
Clendinen, The Abortion Conflict: What It Does to One Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I1, 1985, § 6
(Magazine), at 18 (describing an Oregon clinic that faced firebombs and death threats to staff and
patients, including one incident in which an anti-abortion militant drove up to the doctor's house,
revved up a chainsaw, and threatened to kill him and his family); Linda Greenhouse, Doctor
Spurns Euphemism in Pursuing Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2000, at A7 (describing the
harassment that Dr. Leroy Carhart and his staff have faced for performing abortions, including
arson and vandalism attacks on their homes); Warren M. Hem, Free Speech That Threatens My
Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2001, at A15 (providing a first-hand account of the harassment and
violence some abortion providers face from anti-abortion protestors, including shots fired into
Hem's clinic waiting room, and describing how his professional and private lives have become a
fortress of drawn binds, steel fences, and bulletproof windows).
27. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thomburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656, 669 (E.D.
Pa. 1985); see also Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 524-25 (Tex. 1993) (Spector, J.,
dissenting) (noting that when protestors harass doctors they effectively reduce or eliminate
patients' decisional privacy rights).
28. See Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: And Putting It Back Together Again, in
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1, 11-12 (Ellen Frarben Paul et al. eds., 2000) (arguing for a "balance of
conveniences" test to determine the extent to which we should protect privacy).
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associated with it.29 A third obvious benefit, the satisfaction individuals
derive from freely expressing their views, is discussed in Section IV.B.
1. Deterrence
The first benefit, deterrence, is of questionable legitimacy. To begin
with, protestors have less invasive-though perhaps less effective-means
of deterring patients: They can plead with patients, hand them written
information, etc. Even if cameras act as an especially effective deterrent,
this is because they arouse fear-either of retaliation or of disapproval.
Insofar as cameras carry a threat of retaliation, they are clearly not a
legitimate means of persuasion; to conclude otherwise would be to sanction
vigilante justice. The threat of disapproval is less clear. Some theorists have
argued that gossip is socially valuable because, among other things, it
allows communities to preserve and enforce social norms.30 But while this
kind of argument may justify gossip that enforces commonly held norms-
such as norms against cheating, cruelty, and certain forms of dishonesty-
abortion outing enforces a highly controversial minority norm: the norm
that a fetus, once conceived, must be preserved. And because the power of
disapproval does not depend entirely on sharing the perspective of the
disapproving person-young people are especially sensitive to the
emotional content of disapproval-abortion outing does something more,
and more insidious, than simply prevent deviousness and hypocrisy.
Moreover, because of the climate of violence surrounding clinics, the
threat of disapproval is often indistinguishable from the threat of
retaliation. 3' Protestors cannot be unaware of this fact; to the contrary, the
evidence suggests that they exploit it.32 One anti-abortion protestor tellingly
explained that "[p]eople are ashamed to be there. They don't want to be
there. By shining a light on people that are hiding, sometimes you can
29. In taking stock of the interests of the anti-abortion camp, this Note does not pretend to
speak from a neutral perspective on the issue of abortion. On the contrary, this Note proceeds on
the assumption that abortion is a private act, at least before viability, and that reproductive choice
is an important interest. The interests of anti-abortion protestors are considered here to
acknowledge the complexity of the issue, to engage a wider audience, and to suggest how courts
might balance the interests of the parties before them in a privacy action.
30. See. e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 332-33 (1983) (arguing that the privacy tort
should be eliminated); see also Richard A. Posner, The John A. Sibley Lecture: The Right of
Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 395-96 (1978) (arguing that disclosing personal information about
others is valuable because it reduces hypocrisy and allows people to make more accurate
judgments about each other).
3 1. See, e.g., Clendinen, supra note 25.
32. Abortion outing aimed at clinic staff is more overtly geared toward inspiring fear of
retaliation. See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1065-66
(9th Cir. 2002) (providing statements from the militant anti-abortion community expressing
triumph at having made abortion doctors fear for their lives).
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frighten them into-or sober them into not doing the thing that makes them
ashamed. 33 This comment suggests that, on some level, protestors
understand that, insofar as their outing activities succeed, they succeed as
much by inspiring fear as by inspiring shame. Of course, for abortion
protestors, the value of deterrence, however unpleasant the means, is
infinite: Each abortion deterred is a life saved. But courts can no more
embrace this perspective than they can embrace the perspective of abortion
seekers who, because the decision they have made is deeply personal,
would prefer not to encounter protestors at all.34
2. Publicity
The second benefit cited by anti-abortion activists, publicity, is
arguably more weighty; after all, abortion is a public controversy, and the
public has a right to information about it. It is doubtful, however, that
people learn anything about abortion by watching footage from a camera
trained on a clinic entrance or by being handed a flier with a doctor's
address and home phone number. They may learn something about the
individual patients and staff members whose personal information is thus
transmitted, but this is precisely the sort of information that courts have
protected in other legal contexts.35 Courts have made it clear that while the
social practice of abortion is a public issue, the individual act of abortion is
a private affair. 36 Thus, courts should conclude that any interest protestors
have in publishing patients' and providers' personal information does not
carry significant legal weight.
33. Q&A with Zain Verjee (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 30, 2002). The speaker is David
Leach, who hosts a local cable program and, at the time of the interview, was planning to
broadcast footage of women entering abortion clinics.
34. Indeed, for state courts to take a strong pro-life stance toward abortion outing would risk
running afoul of the Supreme Court's recognition of reproductive choice as a constitutionally
protected interest. See infra Section IV.A.
35. See Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that patients'
identities are not a matter of legitimate public interest); see also infra Section IV.A. Tellingly, the
federal courts have given states more leeway to abridge speech in the interest of protecting patient
privacy than they have given them to do the reverse. Compare Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703
(2000) (upholding a statute limiting the extent to which protestors can approach unwilling
individuals outside health care facilities), with Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v.
Thomburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (striking down Pennsylvania abortion
recordkeeping requirements and rejecting the state's argument that it could compel clinics to
provide statistical information to further the First Amendment interests of anti-abortion
protestors).
36. Of course, anti-abortion protestors reject this distinction because they believe abortion is
an act that concerns two persons, not one. On their view, abortion can no more be a private act
than assault or murder. Although abortion opponents are entitled to view the fetus as a person, the
legal system has rejected this view. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (holding that
fetuses are not "persons" so as to be protected under the Fourteenth Amendment). Consistency
therefore requires that the system characterize decisions about abortion as wholly personal (at
least until the fetus becomes viable).
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Abortion outing, then, is an imperfect means of furthering some
interests and may further only too well other interests that are not legitimate
from the perspective of a pluralist society. On the other side of the scale are
the significant interests of abortion providers and patients in retaining
private space in which to make ethically important, legally protected
decisions, and in avoiding exposure to unwelcome displays of hostility and
condemnation. There is also a second set of interests to weigh: society's
interests in promoting freedom of expression and action. These are
discussed in Part IV, which addresses constitutional considerations.
Having conceptualized the harm caused by abortion outing, I now turn
to the proposed legal remedy for this harm: the common-law privacy torts.
III. THE PRIVACY TORTS
Two privacy torts promise some possibility of relief: "intrusion upon
seclusion" and "publication of private facts., 37
A. Intrusion upon Seclusion
1. Background
The privacy tort most likely to address the harmful manner in which
abortion protestors collect images of patients and staff is the "intrusion
upon seclusion" tort, although it is practically untested in this context. 38 In
describing the parameters of this tort, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D (1977) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]. "Intrusion upon Seclusion" is the section heading for Restatement § 652B;
although the "publication of private facts" tort is entitled "Publicity Given to Private Life" in the
Restatement, this Note uses the simpler term found in many judicial opinions. See, e.g., Lake v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 232 (Minn. 1998). The torts are recognized in many if
not most states, but estimates vary. Compare Angela Christina Couch, Note, Wanted: Privacy
Protection for Doctors Who Perform Abortions, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 361, 376
n.99, 389 n.185 (1996) (estimating that 24 states recognize the intrusion tort and 34 states
recognize the publication tort), with Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law out of the
Closet: A Tort Theory of Liabilityfor Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 998-99 &
nn.41-42 (1995) (estimating that at least 34 states recognize both torts).
For a very good summary of the history and doctrinal elements of the privacy torts, see
Rachel Braunstein, Note, A Remedy for Abortion Seekers Under the Invasion of Privacy Tort, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 309 (2002). Ms. Braunstein and I were co-interns at Planned Parenthood in
summer 2001, and we both independently researched the possible relevance of the privacy torts to
protecting clinic privacy.
38. See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue W.N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1437-39
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (commenting on the lack of precedent "dealing with the taking of photographs
or videotapes of patients entering abortion or family planning clinics," and skirting the issue
itself).
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states: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person. 39
Unlike the other privacy torts, this tort does not require publication of
personal facts. Rather, it focuses the judicial inquiry on whether a defendant
has seriously invaded a plaintiff's personal space, either mental or physical.
The intrusion tort seems particularly suited to abortion outing that targets
abortion patients because protestors often use surveillance precisely as a
means of intruding on patients' solitude.
2. Barriers to Applying the Intrusion Tort to Abortion Outing
The greatest obstacle to using the intrusion tort to redress forms of
abortion outing is that courts generally have held that surveillance in public
places cannot constitute an "intrusion upon seclusion. ' 4° Indeed, the
commentary to the Restatement observes that "while [a person] is walking
on the public highway," there can be no "liability for observing him or even
taking his photograph."' The other classic authority on tort law, Prosser
and Keeton on Torts, likewise reasons that the act of photographing
someone in public without their consent "amounts to nothing more than
making a record, not differing essentially from a full written description, of
a public sight which anyone would be free to see."42 Since clinics generally
open onto a public street, it might seem indisputable that clinic entrances
are not protected zones of privacy for patients or staff.
On a practical level, of course, the Restatement limitation is
problematic.4 3 People do not tend to think of themselves as entirely
accessible to the public at large just because they happen to be outside their
homes. Rather, various public settings are culturally associated with various
degrees of privacy, depending on the "limitation of attention paid, various
social rules, the dispersion of information over space and time, and the
39. RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 652B.
40. See, e.g., Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 769 (N.Y. 1970) (noting that
"there can be no invasion of privacy where the information sought is open to public view");
Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849 (RI. 1998); see also Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 587
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding that surveillance of someone while "in open view of the
public" could not constitute intrusion upon seclusion). In Furman, however, the court noted that
the plaintiff had already sacrificed some expectation of privacy by initiating a personal injury suit,
and that all the plaintiff was observed doing was sailing on his yacht, hardly a fact one would
guard jealously. Id. at 587-88.
41. RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 652B cmt. c.
42. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 856 (5th ed.
1984).
43. For an extended argument for expanding the privacy torts to protcct some degree of
privacy in public, see McClurg. supra note 37.
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ephemeral nature of our use of public space." 4 Crowds afford a sort of
anonymity, where the individual "knows that he is being observed" but
"does not expect to be personally identified and held to the full rules of
behavior and role that would operate if he were known to those observing
him."45 This anonymity offers a "sense of relaxation and freedom 46 that
people value and in fact seek out. For individuals who live in close quarters,
public spaces may provide the sole opportunity for privacy. And, as
Professor Anita Allen has pointed out, many public spaces-for example,
parks-are valued precisely as a means of seclusion and freedom from
sustained observation.47 Of course, that we have an intuitive concept of
public privacy does not make it necessary, worthwhile, or even
administratively feasible for the law to protect a "right" to public privacy.
But courts should at least recognize that public privacy is a coherent and
deeply felt concept, rather than neatly defining it out of existence.
3. Three Ways To Overcome the General Rule Against Public Privacy
In fact, courts have carved out some scattered exceptions to the general
rule against public privacy, exceptions that might be expanded to cover
certain abortion-outing scenarios. The following Subsections draw upon
existing case law to present three possible exceptions to the rule: the subject
matter exception, the exception for especially offensive intrusions, and the
exception for intrusions into intimate relationships.
a. Subject Matter Exception
To begin with, even the commentary to the Restatement admits that
when an individual ventures into the public space, he nonetheless conceals
certain aspects of himself, "such as his underwear or lack of it," and these
aspects are covered by the intrusion tort.4 8 This exception, although narrow,
at least establishes that people do not altogether waive their privacy just by
leaving their homes.
Even more telling is the following example of an actionable intrusion
from the Restatement commentary: "A publishes, without B's consent, a
picture of B nursing her child." 49 This example is surprising because it does
not depend on B nursing in a private place, or on B inadvertently revealing
44. Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of
Privacy in Public Places, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 305, 321 (2000).
45. Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom. Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1021 (1966).
46. Id.
47. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS 124-25 (1988).
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 652B cmt. c.
49. Id. § 652D illus. 10.
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her breast. The Restatement simply presumes that, however publicly or
even flagrantly done, breastfeeding is a private activity. Granted, this
exception stems from societal notions about bodily modesty, especially for
women, and has a paternalistic ring. Nonetheless, by focusing on the
activity itself, rather than on its location or visibility, this exception opens
up the possibility of protecting certain inherently private activities, such as
abortion, especially when they are exposed to the public by necessity rather
than by choice.
At least one court has recognized a subject matter exception to the rule
against public privacy in considering an intrusion claim.50 In Russell v.
American Real Estate Corp., a Texas appellate court considered whether
former tenants of a foreclosed house had a privacy right against the
disturbance of certain belongings that they had temporarily left locked in
their former home.51 The court found that they did have such a right,
rejecting the defendant's contention that they lost their right the moment
they lost tenancy of the house. The court reasoned that whether or not the
plaintiffs lived in the house was irrelevant, as "[t]he invasion of privacy tort
is not limited to intrusions into the home but more generally covers matters
involving 'another's solitude, seclusion, or private affairs or concerns.
' ' 2
What mattered to the court was not whether the house "belonged" to
plaintiffs in some legal sense but that the defendant had broken the
plaintiffs' lock and disturbed their personal belongings. Under such a
theory of the intrusion tort, clinic patients might be able to argue that,
although they had to pass through a public space to reach the clinic, their
errand was obviously private in nature, and their body language conveyed
an interest in avoiding the public.
5 3
Another possible variant of the subject matter exception would focus on
the mental state of the victim at the time of the intrusion. Women entering
the clinic may be unable to disguise their apprehension or ambivalence;
women leaving may be in physical or emotional pain.54 Abortion outing
50. This exception is akin to that regularly recognized in the context of the publication tort.
See infra Section III.B.
51. 89 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App. 2002).
52. Id. at 212 (quoting Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993)).
53. This exception to the locational theory of privacy, based on the nature of the intrusion or
the activity intruded upon, also appears in constitutional case law. In Hill v. Colorado, for
example, the Supreme Court recognized that, even in public places, an individual can be captured
as an audience, and that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting such captives. 530 U.S.
703, 716 (2000).
54. One obvious objection to this approach would be that it would only protect abortion
seekers who were experiencing strong emotions as they entered and left the clinic. However,
given that the intrusion tort by its very nature addresses emotional harm, it makes some sense to
narrow its application to those abortion seekers most likely to be deeply harmed by outing i.e.,
those who are somehow conflicted or embarrassed about their decision. For those seekers who
most want to retain their informational privacy, the publication tort may be more appropriate. See
infra Section III.B.
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disrupts the inwardness of these moments and exposes the patient's inner
life to the public gaze. Such a theory would borrow from the subject matter
theory found in publication tort cases. 55 It arguably appears in one
nineteenth-century case, De May v. Roberts, in which the court found that a
woman giving birth had a right to privacy derived from the "sacred[ness]"
of the occasion.5 6 In the more recent past, however, at least one court has
rejected the mental state theory. 7
b. Exception for Especially Offensive Invasions
Courts also have expanded the privacy tort to cover especially offensive
methods of intrusion into public privacy. If abortion-outing plaintiffs can
focus courts' attention on the method of intrusion, they can argue that the
mix of intrusion and harassment is what distinguishes abortion outing from
more trivial privacy violations. In Nader v. General Motors Corp., for
example, the New York Court of Appeals recognized a limited privacy right
in public.58 In that case, the court considered whether defendants committed
actionable intrusion upon seclusion by putting Ralph Nader under
surveillance in public. The court found that although "the mere observation
of the plaintiff in a public place does not amount to an invasion of his
privacy,... under certain circumstances, surveillance may be so
'overzealous' as to render it actionable." 59 The court's analysis implied that
in assessing for overzealousness, courts (or juries, in most cases) must look
at the plaintiffs behavior and determine whether she was acting discreetly
or flagrantly. 60 Applied to the context of abortion outing, this approach
would suggest that the court should examine the patient's behavior. If she
clearly manifests her desire to be let alone, and not to be photographed or
videotaped, then her entrance into the clinic is a private act deserving of
protection, at least in the absence of countervailing considerations.
Judge Breitel's concurrence in Nader was even more expansive. Breitel
distinguished between normal observation, which picks up a few arbitrary
facts about a person, and surveillance. The latter, which consists of
"extensive or exhaustive monitoring and cataloguing of acts normally
disconnected and anonymous,,' 61 is more intrusive because it affords a
55. See infra Subsection III.B.2. I am grateful to Professor Anita Allen for suggesting this
argument.
56. 9 N.W. 146, 149 (Mich. 1881).
57. See Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.J. 1986) (refusing to
recognize a privacy action for the publication of a photograph of the plaintiffs face in an
expression of anguish, taken when he was a soldier in Vietnam).
58. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
59. Id. at 771.
60. Id. at 770-71.
61. Id. at 772.
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much more complete, more intimate, picture of the individual than normal
observation. While the reasonable person expects to be observed when
appearing in public, she does not expect to be under surveillance, and
therefore, Breitel argued, surveillance should be actionable in certain
(unspecified) circumstances.
The Nader case is also useful because it vividly illustrates intrusiveness
as a form of harassment. According to Nader, General Motors placed him
under surveillance not just because it hoped to uncover embarrassing
information about him but also, and perhaps even more so, because it
wanted him to have the uncomfortable, unnerving, and even destabilizing
feeling of being watched.62 This added dimension may have contributed to
the court's willingness to recognize Nader's claim. 63
Abortion outing serves this same harassment purpose. Anti-abortion
activists use video cameras specifically to scare women entering clinics,
often "point[ing] the cameras directly into [their] faces." 64 Moreover, "[t]he
use of video cameras by defendants often makes patients hysterical or
severely upset, thereby causing a delay in their readiness for prompt
medical attention." 65 Given that the intent, and the effects, of abortion
outing are far more harmful than mere data collection, courts should
conceive of it as fitting within the above-described exceptions to the
general refusal to protect public privacy.
c. Exception for Intrusions into Intimate Relationships
Regardless of whether courts extend the intrusion tort to activities
outside the clinic, they may agree to apply it in those cases where activists
directly intrude into the family lives of patients by contacting their family
members.66 Take the facts of the case described in the Introduction to this
Note.67 Upon learning that the plaintiff was planning to have an abortion,
62. In addition to his invasion of privacy claim, Nader also claimed intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress. Id. at 767.
63. In another line of cases, courts have recognized the harassment component of surveillance
used in investigating personal injury and workers' compensation claims. There, courts have held
that to avoid liability, parties must use unobtrusive surveillance techniques. See, e.g., Pinkerton
Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 132 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963) (finding an intrusion
claim where the defendants had conducted surveillance in an unreasonably intrusive manner);
McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 346 (Or. 1975) (finding no intrusion claim where
the "plaintiff was not aware that he was being watched and filmed").
64. Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue W.N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1426 (W.D.N.Y.
1992).
65. Id. at 1427.
66. This Note does not look at possible intrusion claims by doctors against protestors who
picket outside their homes and harass their families. Such cases are more straightforward because
they involve the well-recognized right to privacy in one's own home. For a brief discussion of
intrusion claims by doctors, see Couch, supra note 37, at 376-81.
67. Robbinsdale Clinic v. Pro-Life Action Ministries, 515 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
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the defendant, either alone or with an associate, called the plaintiff
repeatedly, visited her home, tried to contact her parents, publicized her
identity as she entered the clinic, and, finally, tried to convince her that her
parents were calling the clinic to prevent her from going through with the
abortion. The clinic filed a motion with the court to have the defendant
found in contempt for violating an earlier injunction. A Minnesota appellate
court found the injunction unconstitutional and, in passing, took up the
question of whether the defendant had committed a privacy tort. She had
not, the court concluded, largely because Minnesota did not recognize such
torts, but also because the defendant's efforts to inform the plaintiff's
parents of her abortion had been too targeted to constitute "publication.
68
The incident described above is not isolated. As noted in the
Introduction, anti-abortion activists regularly seek to undermine patients'
privacy by contacting their parents, spouses, and boyfriends. 69 And
although the plaintiffs did not make an intrusion claim in the above case, in
some intuitive nonlegal sense the defendant clearly intruded, or attempted
to intrude, upon Smith's family life. Similarly, efforts to contact patients'
boyfriends or spouses are intrusions into intimate relationships. Surely, the
choices people make about how to structure their most intimate
relationships-what parts of themselves to share in these relationships, and
when to share these parts, and what parts to hold back-are "private
concerns" in the sense intended by the Restatement.
70
While not explicitly supported by precedent, then, an intrusion claim
arising out of efforts to inform family members about an abortion might
succeed if the court responded to commonly held notions about the
importance of family privacy.71 Indeed, an analogous argument prevailed in
0 'Neil v. Schuckardt, in which the court considered an invasion-of-privacy
claim against a fundamentalist Catholic sect that had persuaded the
plaintiffs wife that their marriage was invalid and that she could not be
alone with him.72 The trial court instructed the jury that the common-law
right to privacy "prevent[s] governmental (and private) interference in
intimate personal relationships or activities" and frees the "individual to
make fundamental choices involving himself, his family, and his
relationships with others."73 The appellate court affirmed this interpretation,
68. Id. at 92.
69. See McVicker, supra note 7.
70. See supra text accompanying note 39.
71. Courts have recognized "[a]n individual's right to privacy in an intimate relationship."
John C. v. Martha A., 592 N.Y.S.2d 229, 232 (Civ. Ct. 1992). However, this right is conceived of
as a right of families, or intimates, to hold themselves back from the outside world, not from each
other. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that married couples have
a due process right to use contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that
unmarried couples have the same right).
72. 733 P.2d 693 (Idaho 1996).
73. Id. at 699.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 1559
The Yale Law Journal
without any reference to precedent. Although the court may have been
influenced by the alienation-of-affection aspect of the claim, 74 this jury
instruction is striking for its recognition of "domestic privacy" as an
individual rather than collective right.
The intrusion tort, then, could be made to fit various forms of abortion
outing through any of the three theories suggested above. The purpose of
the tort is especially well-suited to attacking a principal motive of abortion
outers, which is to disrupt abortion seekers' mental states as they enter and
leave the clinic. The following Section takes up a second privacy tort, the
publication-of-private-facts tort, which addresses the ways in which anti-
abortion protestors broadcast the images and data they have collected.
B. Publication-of-Private-Facts Tort
1. Background
In contrast to the intrusion tort, the publication tort addresses harmful
ways in which personal information, once acquired, is disseminated. As
transcribed in the Restatement, it provides that "[o]ne who gives publicity
to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability... if
the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. 75
Much like the intrusion tort, this tort's application has been limited by the
assumption that individuals necessarily sacrifice their privacy when they
venture into public space. Just as the Restatement asserts that the intrusion
tort does not protect individuals from unwelcome photography
"while... walking on the public highway, 76 it also states that the
publication tort does not create "liability for giving further publicity to what
the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye.... [H]e normally cannot
complain when his photograph is taken while he is walking down the public
street and is published in the defendant's newspaper." 77 Thus, with respect
to efforts to capture and broadcast images of abortion staff, the same
question arises in publicity actions as in intrusion actions.
2. The Subject Matter Exception
The publication tort is different from the intrusion tort in that, among
other things, it includes a doctrinally developed "subject matter" alternative
74. The plaintiff made an alienation-of-affection claim, and the court took the opportunity to
abolish that cause of action as anachronistic and unnecessary. Id. at 698.
75. RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 652D.
76. id. § 652B cmt. c; see also supra text accompanying note 41.
77. Id. § 652D cmt. b (emphasis added).
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to the general locational theory of privacy that more explicitly allows for
some degree of public privacy. In the oft-cited case of Daily Times
Democrat v. Graham, for example, an Alabama court chivalrously extended
privacy protection to a woman who had been photographed in public by a
local newspaper just as her skirt was accidentally billowing up to reveal her
nearly naked body from the waist down. 78 In bold common-law-making
fashion, the court found that "[t]o hold that one who is involuntarily and
instantaneously enmeshed in an embarrassing pose forfeits her right of
privacy merely because she happened at the moment to be part of a public
scene would be illogical, wrong, and unjust. 79
The subject matter theory of privacy has been criticized for its
dependence on contingent notions of what facts or states are private; s8 a
woman captured in Graham's pose today on a Manhattan street comer
might not prevail in court. But such criticism misses the mark. Far from
being an unattractive feature of privacy torts, this variability is an example
of the common law's ability to track changing norms. In Daily Times
Democrat, the local newspaper arguably knew it was taking a mortifying
picture and therefore knowingly assumed a risk of liability. By contrast, a
contemporary newspaper might not know how the picture would be
received, and that uncertainty would rightly figure into the court's decision
whether to impose liability. If abortion-outing victims can focus courts on
the subject matter of the information being publicized, as opposed to its
(public or private) location, they have a strong case for classifying that
information as private. As evidence of social norms, plaintiffs can point
both to constitutional case law on medical informational privacy8 1 and to
the abundance of recent federal legislation protecting the privacy of medical
and other kinds of information.
8 2
78 162 So. 2d474 (Ala. 1964).
79. Id. at 478.
80. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 30, at 349-50.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 129-131.
82. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 264, 110 Stat. 1936, 2033 (establishing a timetable for enacting federal law protecting
medical privacy); HIPAA Privacy Regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2002) (setting a floor preemption
for medical privacy); 45 C.F.R. § 164 (establishing strict consent and transparency requirements
for any information disclosures); see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 502,
113 Stat. 1338, 1437 (1999) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6810, 6821-6827 (2002))
(regulating financial information-sharing practices by financial institutions); Driver's Privacy
Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2721-2725). Of course, local norms count as well, see infra text accompanying notes 98-102,
and these might weigh against abortion privacy. In such a case, however, plaintiffs could still
invoke the role of the courts as protectors of vulnerable minorities. See infra note 104 and
accompanying text.
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a. The Subject Matter Exception and Abortion Providers
The publication tort's application to abortion outing aimed at providers
is more straightforward. To deter and intimidate providers, anti-abortion
protestors publicize providers' personal information, including their names,
addresses, telephone numbers, and other details.83 Courts are likely to
consider this information in the context of widespread harassment of, and
violence against, abortion providers. At least one court has already done so
in settling a discovery dispute. In Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v.
Superior Court, which involved claims and counterclaims between the
clinic and protestors, the protestors moved to compel the disclosure of all
abortion staff and volunteers who had seen or written a report about the
protests, and prevailed at the trial level.84 The appellate court reversed the
discovery order, holding that the privacy interests of the nonparties
outweighed the discovery value of this information, particularly in light of
current abortion-outing practices and their effects. "The Nuremberg Files
website," wrote Justice Haerle, "is specific evidence that Planned
Parenthood's staff and volunteers could well face unique and very real
threats not just to their privacy, but to their safety and well-being if personal
information about them is disclosed.,
85
As Golden Gate suggests, in an admittedly different context, whether or
not information is private should be considered in terms of the possible
consequences of disclosure.86 Thus, even when personal information-for
example, names, addresses, and telephone numbers-is available through
public records or the media, courts might still protect such information from
disclosure for inflammatory purposes.8 7 Anti-abortion protestors generally
publicize abortion providers' personal information along with a general,
heated condemnation of their activities.88 Furthermore, they deliberately
publicize this information to an audience likely to act on it in ways that are
themselves tortious and possibly criminal. 89 Abortion providers, aware of
83. The Nuremberg Files website collects such additional information as providers' social
security numbers and the names and birthdates of their spouses, children, and friends, See The
Nuremberg Files, supra note 1I. The Nuremberg Files website also states that this information
will be shared with "local or national pro-life organizations." Id.
84. 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Ct. App. 2000).
85. Id. at 639.
86. See id. at 638.
87. See id. at 642-43 (citing Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994)
(holding that federal agencies could not disclose the home addresses of their employees to the
employees' collective bargaining representatives, even if such information was available
elsewhere)).
88. See supra note 11.
89. See supra note 26. For an account of an extended harassment campaign conducted outside
one doctor's home, see Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 514-15 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting).
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this, make special efforts to protect their personal information.9" All of
these factors, combined with the public policy expressed by Congress's
recent passage of the Drivers' Privacy Protection Act, 91 suggest that
abortion providers would have an extremely strong claim against those
publishing their personal information.
b. The Subject Matter Exception and Abortion Seekers
The wrongful publicity tort might also have some application to
abortion outing aimed at patients-for example, picket signs bearing
information about individual patients and video footage of patients' faces
posted on the Internet and elsewhere. 92 As with abortion doctors, the severe
consequences of abortion outing for abortion seekers93 may, and should,
influence courts as they assess whether the publicized information is private
or public. Indeed, at least one court has recognized a publication claim by
an abortion seeker (in the context of reversing summary judgment for the
defendants in a strongly worded opinion). In Doe v. Mills, the defendants
obtained information about two women scheduled to undergo abortions
and, on the day of their appointments, stood at the entrance to the clinic
parking lot holding up signs displaying their names.94 Responding to the
trial court's argument that the information publicized could not be private
because abortion was the subject of intense public debate, the court held
that the decision to have an abortion is a private fact because "abortion
concerns matters of sexual relations and medical treatment, both of which
are regarded as private matters. 95
Mills's expansive conception of privacy is by no means universal. In
United States v. Vazquez, by contrast, a federal district court in Connecticut
refused to seal tapes obtained through discovery that depicted patients
entering and leaving the clinic. 96 According to the court, the space just
outside the clinic was not merely public, but highly public, because it was
the site of constant conflict and advocacy. Consequently, no privacy right
existed because "no one walking in this area could have a legitimate
expectation of privacy."97 This line of reasoning is troubling because it
90. See Couch, supra note 37, at 393 (describing how doctors keep their numbers unlisted,
drive different cars to work, and even wear disguises to work).
91. See supra note 17.
92. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
93. See ACLU Brief, supra note 24.
94. 536 N.W.2d 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). This case illustrates the lengths to which
protestors will go to gather such information. Late at night, an associate of the defendants climbed
into the clinic's dumpster, found a slip of paper with the information that the plaintiffs were
scheduled to have abortions, and passed the information along to the defendants. Id. at 827.
95. Id. at 830.
96. 31 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Conn. 1998).
97. Id. at 91.
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suggests that the more anti-abortion protestors "publicize" a certain location
(i.e., turn it into an active public forum), the less is the privacy to which
patients are entitled. While it is inevitable that the "should" of privacy law
be controlled to some extent by the "is" (that is, the law generally will
protect only those spheres in which individuals expect privacy because they
generally have privacy), it is dangerous to allow a small, activist social
group to set the standards for society at large.
Another case to address the issue of public privacy takes a more
complicated position, somewhere between the poles of Mills and Vasquez.
In Chico Feminist Women's Health Center v. Scully, the plaintiffs tried to
bar anti-abortion protestors from gathering at a clinic entrance; 98 they
argued that the practice violated California's constitutional right to
privacy" because the clinic was located in a small town and protestors were
likely to recognize, and had in fact recognized, clinic patients. The court
analyzed the problem using a "reasonable expectation of privacy"'
' 0
standard and held that the very closeness of the community should have
removed any expectation of privacy. "Having chosen to live in the
environment of a small city," the court opined, "the residents of Chico
cannot expect the courts, by way of injunctive relief, to guarantee them the
kind of anonymity they might find in a 'large metropolitan community'
such as New York City."'
01
The facts in Chico supported the court's holding. The trial court had
already enjoined the defendants from publicizing information about who
was seeking an abortion. What plaintiffs were appealing was the court's
refusal to go further-to enjoin defendants from standing near the clinic
entrance. The gist of the appellate court's reasonable expectation analysis
was that courts cannot prevent protestors from seeing what anyone on the
street can see. This rule seems relatively uncontroversial. More generally,
the court's approach is interesting because it ties privacy rights to the
norms, or "common habits,"'10 2 of a specific community.
Chico's pragmatic approach is more protective than that adopted in
Vasquez because it allows local majority, rather than assertive minority,
norms to dictate. Thus, courts might provide greater privacy protections in
less insular communities and might distinguish between degrees of
publicity-as the Chico court distinguished between mere observation,
98. 256 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1989).
99. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § I.
100. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing
that evidence obtained from wiretapping a conversation in a public telephone booth without
judicial authorization was inadmissible in a criminal trial because the defendant had a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" while talking on the phone).
101. Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr., 256 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
102. Id.
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which was allowable, and videotaping, which was not.' °3 At the same time,
Chico is troubling because it seems to imply that courts can never override
the community's judgment about the degree of privacy to which the
individual is entitled. As such, it ignores the judiciary's historic role as a
guardian of individual rights against majority preferences.10 4
3. What Constitutes "Publicity"?
The three opinions contrasted in the previous Subsection address the
issue of whether the information publicized is "private." Another issue that
might arise in suits for abortion outing is whether the information has been
"publicized." While anti-abortion protestors generally publicize information
about abortion providers indiscriminately, they engage in a much more
tailored outing of patients. Namely, anti-abortion protestors often contact
family members and boyfriends, knowing that these people are most likely
to intervene and prevent the abortion.'0 5 And at least one court has rejected
a publicity claim, reasoning that disclosure cannot constitute wrongful
"publicity" unless made to a large group of people or to the public at
large. 1
06
Although such a limitation might generally make sense as a way to
avoid the administrative burden of adjudicating claims based on trivial
disclosures, it seems arbitrary in the context of abortion outing. If anti-
abortion protestors disclose personal information to the very people from
whom patients most want this information kept, then the harm is as great as
if they had broadcast the information to the world. This is not, in other
words, a case of innocent gossip. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has
recognized the significance of the privacy interest at stake by holding that
states cannot disclose abortion-related information to families or would-be
fathers.' '7 Just as the Golden Gate court addressed the question of whether
103. At least one other court has made this distinction between a waiver of absolute privacy
and a waiver of any privacy. The Ninth Circuit noted:
One who invites another to his home or office takes a risk that the visitor may not be
what he seems, and that the visitor may repeat all he hears and observes when he
leaves. But he does not and should not be required to take the risk that what is heard
and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording, or in our modem world, in full
living color and hi-fi to the public at large or to any segment of it that the visitor may
select.
Dieternann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
104. For the related argument that privacy rules should be normative and not simply
descriptive, see Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1142-43
(2002).
105. See McVicker, supra note 7.
106. Robbinsdale Clinic v. Pro-Life Action Ministries, 515 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994) (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 652D cmt. a).
107. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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certain information was "private" from the functionalist perspective of how
harmful disclosure would be,' °8 courts should likewise be made more
attentive, in defining "publicity," to the actual or likely degree of harm
given the particulars of each case.1 °9
C. Limitations
Two possible defenses to a common-law privacy action for abortion
outing have been addressed above,110 and the First Amendment defense is
discussed below in Part IV. Two other defenses, however, deserve mention:
the "matter of public concern" defense and the public figure defense. While
courts have generally been somewhat protective of the identity of abortion
providers and patients, they have been less so with respect to doctors who
receive state Medicaid funds to perform abortions, on the theory that the
public has a right to know how its money is being spent."' This exception
may be limited; one court expressed its reliance on the fact that Medicaid-
funded abortions were less controversial, and less likely to expose doctors
to hostility, because they were limited to cases of medical emergency."2
Likewise, while courts usually do not classify doctors as public figures,
they may be willing to view some especially prominent abortion providers
as public figures, especially if they hold, or are under consideration for,
some public position. 113 Of course, even doctors who become public figures
may be entitled to a minimum of privacy in jurisdictions that extend privacy
rights to public figures. California, for example, prohibits surveillance of
the private lives of public figures. 114
Finally, even if the privacy torts were recognized as covering abortion
outing, they would provide only a limited remedy. Most importantly, as ex
post solutions, they could never completely compensate patients and staff
for what may well be lasting, irreversible damage to their privacy. Also,
108. See Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Ct. App.
2000).
109. Of course, even if the court insists on rigid adherence to the numbers limitation, a
publicity case could be made out against individual anti-abortion protestors who share abortion-
related details with fellow protestors. But such facts would normally be harder to prove.
110. For a discussion of the argument that, because abortion is a public controversy, abortion-
related information cannot be private, see supra Part 1I. For a discussion of the argument that
abortion outing cannot violate privacy rights because it takes place in public, see supra Sections
ILA, III.B.
111. E.g., Family Life League v. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 493 N.E.2d 1054 (111. 1986); Kansas ex
rel. Stephan v. Harder, 641 P.2d 366 (Kan. 1982).
112. Family Life League, 493 N.E.2d at 1058.
113. See Couch, supra note 37, at 396-99 (discussing the public figure defense).
114. CAL. CIV. CODF § 1708.8(b) (West 2001). Although the term "public figure" never
appears in this provision, it was enacted specifically to protect public figures against harassment
by the press. See Note, Privacy, Technology, and the California "Anti-Paparazzi" Statute, 112
HARV. L. REv. 1367, 1368 (1999) (discussing the circumstances giving rise to the provision).
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anti-abortion protestors are famously and gleefully judgment-proof, and
private causes of action, unlike statutes, do not carry the possibility of
alternative sanctions. They are best thought of, then, as a complement to,
rather than a replacement for, ordinances, rulings, and injunctions that close
off various avenues of discovery, limit how close protestors can come, and
prevent them from filming or photographing the clinic entrance.
Because the privacy torts involve interests-privacy and speech-that
are central to constitutional law, how these torts develop will depend in part
on constitutional precedent. Part IV considers this precedent.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKDROP
In various ways, abortion outing and possible responses implicate state
and federal constitutional privacy rights. This Part first considers the ways
in which the Constitution might strengthen a privacy action against anti-
abortion protestors and then considers the most obvious constitutional
objection to such an action: the First Amendment.
A. Constitutional Privacy Rights
Of course, the Federal Constitution does not affirmatively obligate the
states to protect individuals against third parties.' Moreover, privacy
actions against private parties raise First Amendment concerns that are
absent from the debate over governmental measures that affect privacy.""
Nonetheless, state courts have, on occasion, assumed a positive obligation
to protect federal constitutional rights and have construed these rights as
being not just against the state but against the world.1 17 Constitutional
jurisprudence is also relevant as a reflection of common intuitions and
community norms about privacy-albeit at the national level. And finally,
when the Court extends constitutional protection to certain practices, it in
some sense validates those practices and thereby provides an institutionally
115. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
116. See Zimmerman, supra note 30, at 298-99.
117. Take, for example, "wrongful birth" suits, or suits based on the theory that but for a
defendant doctor's negligence, the plaintiff woman would have acquired information about a fetal
disability and with this information would have decided to abort her child. Prior to Roe v. Wade,
most courts refused to recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth. After Roe, the Seventh
Circuit and courts in Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New York held that Roe
compelled them to recognize the cause of action as an extension of a woman's constitutional right
to choice. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1981); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d
883, 885 (Conn. 1982); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 346 (N.H. 1986); Berman v. Allan, 404
A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 810-11, 815 (N.Y. 1978)
(connecting the two implicitly in the majority opinion and explicitly in Judge Fuchsberg's
concurrence).
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normative ground for the common law to protect them against interference
by private parties.
118
Most obviously, abortion outing effectively limits the federal right to
decisional privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade as encompassing the right to
decide whether or not to have an abortion. Post-Roe abortion jurisprudence
has recognized that, to have meaningful decisional privacy, women need a
certain amount of informational privacy. 9 In Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, for example, the Court struck
down a law that, among other things, required physicians to complete a
detailed report for each abortion they performed.120 This requirement, the
Court held, would unduly compromise patients' informational privacy, a
necessary component of the decisional privacy right recognized in Roe.
"The decision to terminate a pregnancy," wrote Justice Blackmun for the
majority, "is an intensely private one that must be protected in a way that
assures anonymity."'
' 2 1
Justice Stevens drew the connection even more clearly in his
concurrence in Bellotti v. Baird: "It is inherent in the right to make the
abortion decision that the right may be exercised without public
scrutiny .... The express purpose of abortion outing, as directed against
patients, is to "'reinforce the stigma attached with abortion"" 23 and to force
patients to think of others "watching [them] do it"124 -in other words, to
deprive patients of the very privacy that, in many cases, makes it possible
for them to choose abortion. As such, states have a strong interest in
curtailing and punishing such activities. This interest should prompt the
judiciary to be receptive to common-law privacy and privacy-related
abortion-outing claims.125 Abortion-staff outing also implicates the First
1 18. See Solove, supra note 104, at 1143 (arguing that the value of "privacy" in a certain
context derives from the value of the practice in which it is embedded).
119. "Decisional privacy" is equivalent to autonomy. It is the ability to decide in private-
that is, decide as individuals-how to behave. By contrast, "informational privacy," as used
below, is a more literal sense of the word "privacy" -- that is, the ability to protect personal facts
about ourselves. The two forms, though obviously related, are conceptually distinct.
120. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
121. Id. at 766.
122. 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) (striking down a Massachusetts
provision requiring parental notification before a minor could undergo an abortion). Three other
Justices joined Justice Stevens's concurrence. Id. at 623.
123. McVicker, supra note 7 (quoting the website of Life Dynamics, a Texas anti-abortion
organization).
124. Hannity & Colmes: One-on-One with Neil Horsley (FOX News television broadcast,
June 4, 2001).
125. Many plaintiffs combine privacy claims with other, clearly related claims such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Vescovo v. New Way Enters., 130 Cal. Rptr.
86 (Ct. App. 1976); Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). For a skeptical
reception of the "position that a constitutional right to privacy exists where a woman seeking an
abortion travels on a public street to enter an abortion clinic," see United States v. Vazquez, 31 F.
Supp. 2d 85, 89 (D. Conn. 1998).
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Amendment freedom of association.126 As the Court observed in NAACP v.
Alabama, there is a "vital relationship between freedom to associate and
privacy in one's associations.' ' 27 At least one court has made this
connection in the abortion context, holding that a discovery order
mandating disclosure of names of clinic staff and volunteers would
"implicate[] the rights of nonparties to freely and privately associate with
Planned Parenthood.',
128
Abortion outing endangers a third constitutional right-the limited right
to informational privacy recognized in Whalen v. Roe 129 and subsequent
cases. Medical information, at issue in Whalen, is generally recognized as
the sort of information that should be kept private whenever possible. That
a woman was pregnant and had an abortion is, among other things, a
medical fact. As such, it is constitutionally protected under Whalen. Thus,
in Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Blake, a state
supreme court refused to allow defendants in a civil rights suit to depose
those abortion patients on whose behalf Planned Parenthood had filed
suit. 30 Citing Whalen, the court held that "[t]he constitutional right of
privacy concerns a person's interest both in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters and in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions." 13 1 Federal constitutional privacy jurisprudence, then, provides
persuasive authority for affording strong common-law privacy protection to
abortion patients.
State constitutional protections may be even more useful than federal
ones. The California Constitution, for example, enumerates a specific
privacy right, 32 one that has been held both to be broader than the federal
right and to shield individuals against violations by third parties.' 33 In Chico
Feminist Women's Health Center v. Scully, a California appellate court
found that the state's "right of privacy protects information about a citizen's
participation in a medical procedure, including abortion." 134 Although, as
described in Section III.B, the court went on to find that this right did not
extend to protect patients' anonymity on the streets, the issues in that case
were somewhat peculiar. The court might have responded differently had it
126. The Court has read the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating this associational right
against the states. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding unconstitutional
Alabama's effort to compel the NAACP to disclose its membership list).
127. Id. at 462.
128. Planned Parenthood v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 637 (Ct. App. 2000).
129. 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding New York reporting requirements for some prescription
drugs on the grounds that their design reflected due concern for patients' privacy rights).
130. 631 N.E.2d 985 (Mass. 1994).
131. Id. at992 n.ll.
132. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. The California Constitution has also been interpreted to allow
for attorney's fees to be awarded against private defendants. Planned Parenthood v. Aakhus, 17
Cal. Rptr. 2d 510 (Ct. App. 1993).
133. See Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Scully, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1989).
134. Id. at 199.
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been confronted with a claim based on publication of information. Four
years later, in considering a claim against protestors primarily for
trespassing on the clinic's private property but also for outing practices, the
court held that "by photographing and videotaping respondent's clients,
appellants actually did deny them their right to privacy under the California
Constitution. 135
The constitutional rights just described create a background against
which privacy interests have meaning, legitimacy, and weight. They also
provide a ready normative language for describing these qualities. The
Constitution does not, however, directly obligate the states to take any
affirmative actions. A more important caveat is that whatever actions state
courts or legislatures do take are limited by the First Amendment.
B. First Amendment Limits on Privacy Protection
The First Amendment prohibits legislation "abridging the freedom of
speech." 13 6 Abortion outing is speech in several senses: Intentional
intrusions are a form of expressive conduct intended to convey anger,
sorrow, or condemnation, and activists publicize personal information
through verbal and written words. Moreover, the practice of abortion is a
political issue of great public concern, and thus advocacy for and against
abortion is undeniably part of the "robust democratic debate" '137 that the
First Amendment was specifically intended to protect. Any attempt to
curtail abortion outing, then, raises significant First Amendment issues.
This Section first reviews relevant First Amendment doctrine, then turns to
two recent applications in the abortion context, and finally concludes with
some general observations about how First Amendment concerns should be
approached in abortion-related cases.
The First Amendment has been interpreted as protecting written and
spoken words more strongly than expressive conduct.' 38 In both cases, the
Amendment is broadly construed; no one has the right to be absolutely
insulated from unwelcome speech. States, however, can place content-
neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech to further legitimate
state interests, and courts can fashion narrowly tailored injunctions to
curtail "abusive conduct" and minimize the "emotional distress" caused by
135. Aakhus, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
137. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 62 (1982) (holding that state court nullification of
election results based on an objectionable promise made by a candidate violated the First
Amendment).
138. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) ("The government generally has a freer
hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word.").
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speech. 139 Courts have also recognized that states have a legitimate interest
in protecting unwilling, captive audiences. 40 In fashioning content-neutral
restrictions, courts can consider which activities are "basically incompatible
with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.' 41 But
they must leave open "ample alternative channels for communication of the
information."' 142 The test for content neutrality is not the practical effect of
the restrictions but rather whether they serve some purpose unrelated to the
content of the regulated speech. 143 Finally, some harmful speech can be
prohibited outright if it intentionally threatens grave harm or "'prepar[es] a
group for violent action and steel[s] it to such action,"' but not if it merely
amounts to "'abstract teaching... of the moral propriety or even moral
necessity for a resort to force and violence."
44
This body of precedent suggests that outing practices such as
videotaping may be less protected than actual speech and therefore more
vulnerable to a tort action for violation of privacy. In assessing a privacy
tort action against the background of the First Amendment, courts may look
to how abusive the conduct in question is and to whether abortion patients
and providers made to run a gauntlet in front of a clinic can be called
"captive" for First Amendment purposes. 45 They may ask whether the
conduct is "incompatible" with the day-to-day operations of the clinic.
They may consider the likelihood that awarding damages will unreasonably
chill nontortious anti-abortion advocacy. Courts may also be willing to
prohibit certain privacy violations, such as publication of personal
information about abortion providers, if plaintiffs can show that these
violations were designed to place them in imminent danger or to convey a
direct threat of violence.
139. Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr., 256 Cal. Rptr. at 203 (describing approvingly
how the trial court had gone about fashioning its injunction). In general, though, appellate courts
scrutinize injunctions more closely for constitutional defects than they do statutes or ordinances
because there is a greater risk that injunctions will be issued selectively, based on impermissible
factors. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1994) (opining that
because injunctions carry a greater risk of"discriminatory application" than does legislation, they
are subject to "a somewhat more stringent application of general First Amendment principles,"
but nonetheless upholding the challenged injunction).
140. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting
picketing outside private residences).
141. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (holding that an anti-noise ordinance
aimed at disturbances in the vicinity of classrooms in session did not violate the First
Amendment).
142. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1982) (upholding the
federal government's refusal to allow individuals to sleep on public land in a demonstration to call
attention to the problem of homelessness).
143. Id.
144. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (quoting Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
145. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (concluding that abortion patients are
sufficiently captive to justify some state protection).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 1571
The Yale Law Journal
Given the scarcity of common-law actions against abortion outing,
there is no developed First Amendment case law on the subject. Two recent
cases, however, address closely related questions and are therefore
noteworthy. In Hill v. Colorado, the Court upheld a state law that restricted
how close protestors could come (without first obtaining consent) to
patients entering and leaving medical facilities. 46 The Court recognized
that Colorado had a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens' welfare,
freedom of access to medical facilities, and interest in "be[ing] let alone."'147
It connected the state's interest to the individual's common-law right to
privacy, both explicitly and by quoting the famous Olmstead v. United
States dissent of Justice Brandeis, who first, as a theorist, persuaded courts
to recognize privacy rights in their common-law jurisprudence and later, as
a jurist, championed privacy in his constitutional jurisprudence. 48 The
individual's right to be let alone, the majority held, "must be placed in the
scales with the right of others to communicate.
1 49
Equally important for present purposes, the Hill court eschewed the
more abstract perspective often assumed in First Amendment jurisprudence
and took a hard look at the reality behind the case: "Persons who are
attempting to enter health care facilities-for any purpose-are often in
particularly vulnerable physical and emotional conditions., 150 Finally, the
Court was willing to accept the risk of chilling some harmless speech as the
price of protecting other important interests. 5 1 Hill suggests that, despite
possible First Amendment reservations, courts will be willing to
countenance privacy actions in which significant, palpable harm is alleged.
Another recent decision that may influence the development of the
privacy torts is the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in Planned Parenthood
v. American Coalition of Life Activists, which upheld a jury verdict against
anti-abortion protestors for, among other things, violating FACE. 52 The
court agreed with the plaintiff physicians that the Nuremberg Files and
other tactics aimed at harassing abortion doctors constituted "true threats"
of force within the meaning of FACE and were, therefore, not protected
146. Id. at 735.
147. Id. at 718 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
148. Id. at 716-17 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)). For a fuller account of the connection between Brandeis's scholarship and the
privacy torts, see Zimmerman, supra note 30, at 292-99.
149. Hill, 530 U.S. at 718 (citation omitted). But see id. at 750-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the view that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting an individual's right to be
let alone).
150. Id. at 729.
151. Id.
152. 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). For a description of FACE, see supra note 16
and accompanying text.
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under the First Amendment. 53 The court reversed a panel opinion by Judge
Kozinski, which had held that the jury was not authorized to consider
context in assessing whether challenged conduct amounted to a threat of
violence and was only authorized to impose liability if the defendants had
themselves directly threatened, or had explicitly "authorized" others, to
commit violence. 154 The Life Activists en banc opinion is especially
welcome for its recognition that context matters. Because context is very
much in the minds of both anti-abortion protestors and abortion seekers and
providers-indeed, context is what makes abortion outing so popular and so
effective as a means of coercion-context likewise must inform a court's
assessment of abortion outing, whether it is hearing constitutional
challenges to speech restrictions or privacy tort claims. Unfortunately, Life
Activists may not have settled the matter once and for all. The court was
closely divided (6-5), 155 and the case is considered a likely candidate for a
writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. 1
56
Free speech advocates often argue, and courts often assume, as did the
Ninth Circuit panel, that most offensive and even harmful speech must be
protected so as to avoid chilling other, desirable speech.157 One critic of Life
Activists, for example, argued that, while the defendants' activities may
have reasonably and predictably provoked fear, "much vigorous political
speech often does precisely that""'--as if no workable line could be drawn
between speech that makes people reasonably fear for their lives and
"vigorous political speech." But any time constitutional law requires a
delicate balancing of competing interests, as does First Amendment
jurisprudence, some lawful behavior will be chilled. When faced with a
153 Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1085-86. The court read FACE's "threat of
force" as coextensive with the "true threats" excluded from First Amendment protection. Id. at
1077.
154. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1014, 1018 (9th
Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that to allow juries to consider
the context of ambiguous statements, such as threats based on previous acts of violence by
nondefendants, would impermissibly chill public debate). Judge Kozinski's opinion seemed to be
based in part on a bizarre and somewhat frightening romanticism about past uses of violence to
achieve lofty goals, from American independence to abolition. Id. at 1014. The en banc court
rightly rejected Kozinski's implication that violence and intimidation are somehow constitutive of
robust political debate. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1086.
155. 290 F.3d at 1058.
156. Travis Loop, Laying Down Media Law: Free Speech and Public Access Punctuate the
Docker, PRESSTIME, Nov. 2002, at 33.
157. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that the First Amendment
prohibits states from imposing sanctions for the publication of a rape victim's name, where the
information was already on public record in connection with a public prosecution); Zimmerman,
supra note 30.
158. Ronald K.L. Collins & Robert Corn-Revere, Wanted! First Amendment Protection:
Clamping Down on Anti-Abortion Web Site Risks Speech for Everyone, LEGAL TIMES, June 3,
2002, at 75; see also Opinion, Chilling Effect: Provocative, Even Repugnant Speech Doesn't
Necessarily Constitute a Threat, GAZETTE, June 4, 2002, Metro, at 6 (condemning the Ninth
Circuit's ruling in Life Activists).
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regulation that inhibits protected speech, courts do not simply strike it
down; they perform a painstaking balancing test to see if countervailing
interests are sufficiently weighty to justify the harm. 5 9 The moral
imperative to engage in this intellectually messy task of imperfect line
drawing stems from the fact that, if courts abdicate this task, they allow,
perhaps needlessly, activities that traumatize patients and endanger doctors'
lives.
In the final analysis, the degree to which one tolerates limitations on
speech depends on one's theory of why free speech is important. For those
primarily motivated by distrust of state power, the First Amendment may be
overridden, if at all, only in extreme situations. However, many theorists
view the First Amendment more instrumentally-valuing it, for example,
because it contributes to the free exchange of ideas, or promotes democracy
or autonomy.' Because speech often impinges on the rights of others, an
instrumental view of the First Amendment requires that those rights be
considered as possible reasons for limiting the speech in question. The
practice of abortion outing, for example, brings two types of freedom of
expression into tension: the freedom to voice one's views through
aggressive advocacy and intimidation, generally acknowledged to be
protected by the First Amendment, and the freedom to express one's views
in choices about how to live, which is often protected in privacy tort actions
and constitutional privacy cases.
Many individuals engage in lawful activities that appear morally
objectionable, and possibly even dangerous, to some segment of the
population: marital infidelity, gun ownership, and enjoyment of hard-core
pornography, to name a few. The question is to whom they should be
accountable when they engage in such activities. Virtually everyone
agrees that some forms of private accountability are an important and
necessary source of morality. For example, an unfaithful husband ought to
be accountable to his family and to his friends, a minister who violates the
tenets of her religion ought to be accountable to her congregation, and a
lazy student ought to be accountable to her teachers and parents.
159. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729 (2000) (acknowledging that the law "will
sometimes inhibit" harmless advocacy, but maintaining that such chilling was inevitable given the
difficulty of drawing a line that adequately protects patients). Indeed, there is some evidence of an
emerging national policy that medical privacy trumps freedom of speech per se. See Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 164, 110
Stat. 1936, 2033 (protecting the privacy of medical records without including a free speech
exception).
160. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62
(1980) (implying that one purpose of the First Amendment is to promote the availability of
information); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REv. 964 (1978) (arguing that freedom of speech promotes autonomy).
161. Accountability is used here to describe one's moral obligation to explain one's actions to
others and, likewise, the right others have to express their disapproval of one's actions.
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But if we make private individuals universally accountable, as anti-
abortion protestors do when they disseminate doctors' and patients' names
and faces on the Internet, we arguably violate their moral autonomy.
Unmoored from the libertarian, majoritarian limits of the state and from the
context of personal relationships, universal accountability imposes a kind of
super-Kantian imperative: Only commit those acts that you would not mind
exposing to the endless scrutiny, judgment, and reaction of the entire
world. 162 The results of this imperative, in the long run, would closely
resemble the results of suppressing speech: greater moral convergence,
followed by less moral debate, followed in turn by less independent
reflection. 163
The argument against universal accountability has particular force with
respect to the practice of abortion because abortion is both an intimate and
significant individual decision and a subject of heated moral and political
controversy. For abortion to retain this essential former character, for it to
even exist as a subject of debate, individual abortion seekers and providers
must not be dragged into the eye of the controversy. "It is inherent in the
right to make the abortion decision that the right may be exercised without
public scrutiny," as Justice Stevens famously wrote,' 64 because without
privacy, one's choice is effectively made by others.
V. CONCLUSION
The common-law privacy rights, largely unnoticed by victims of
abortion outing, may cover, or may evolve to cover, many outing
techniques. In particular, this Note has considered two torts that seem, on
their face, particularly promising: the intrusion-upon-seclusion tort, which
covers particularly offensive invasions of personal space, and the
publication-of-private-facts tort, which protects the privacy of sensitive
information. The intrusion tort may be difficult to use because courts
traditionally have limited it to intrusions occurring in private places.
Likewise, attempts to apply the publication tort to abortion outing are likely
162. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 17 (H.J. Paton
trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1785) ("1 ought never to act except in such a way that I can also
will that my maxim should become a universal law.").
163. Edward Bloustein captured this point when he wrote:
The man.., whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is subject to
public scrutiny . . merges with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never to be
different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be conventionally accepted ones;
his feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal
warmth and to become the feelings of every man.
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964); see also Westin, supra note 45, at 1022-24.
164. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens's concurrence.
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to raise questions about whether information gathered in public can ever be
considered "private" and whether targeted disclosure to family members-a
common abortion-outing tactic-constitutes "publication."
Plaintiffs might overcome these obstacles by drawing on analogous
case law in which courts have stretched the intrusion and publication torts
to provide some privacy protection to moments and information that are in
some aspect public. In particular, courts might be persuaded to extend
protection against abortion outing by focusing on the following factors: the
medical and sexual aspects of abortion, which make it an inherently private
act; the intention to shock and intimidate that often motivates abortion
outing; the importance of family privacy, which abortion outing often
disrupts; and the risk of violence to which abortion outing exposes both
abortion seekers and abortion providers.
Plaintiffs can draw on constitutional considerations to further support
their claims. Constitutional norms of decisional, associational, and
informational privacy provide persuasive authority for a state interest in
curtailing abortion outing. While the First Amendment protects abortion
outing from outright elimination, it also allows for state actions that restrict
abortion outing that is particularly intrusive and obstructive, provided they
leave meaningful space for legitimate protest activities.
On a more theoretical level, the very principles so often cited to defend
free speech-pluralism and dissent-also support strong privacy
protections for abortion seekers and providers. If individuals are not
permitted to make fundamental ethical decisions without subjecting
themselves to universal scrutiny and retaliation from any disapproving
minority, then their actions-and eventually, perhaps, their views-will
homogenize in much the way they might without free speech. This is not, of
course, an argument for any affirmative state obligations to prevent such a
result, but it does imply that the courts should not, simply out of First
Amendment concerns, abandon the privacy torts. On balance, we are a freer
society for them.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1576 [Vol. 112: 1545
